What should a court do when a lawsuit involving the same parties and the same issues is already pending in the court
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the idea of transnational law as a solution to international challenges has captivated legal academia. 1 Whether because of globalization, 2 changes in law and theory, 3 or other reasons, 4 transnational cases have taken on greater significance. 5 Transnational law is now taught as a first-year course in law schools, 6 and national courts, applying domestic law, have [Vol. emerged to play an important, if not the primary, role in responding to cross-border challenges. 7 As transnational actions have increased, however, new difficulties present themselves.
One of the more intractable difficulties is the problem of parallel proceedings. What should a court do when a lawsuit involving the same parties and the same issues is already pending in the court of another country? Finding a coherent answer to this question has not been easy. Yet a pressing need to find one exists. The number of foreign parallel proceedings, like the number of transnational cases, is on the rise.
8 And with the loosening of jurisdictional doctrines, as well as the spread of American-style liti-
Integrating Transnational Legal Perspectives into the First Year Civil Procedure
Curriculum, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479, 479 (2006) (noting the "move to globalize the curriculum at other law schools has gathered steam, fueled by conferences, symposia, and workshops. . . with current efforts aimed at ensuring 'that the vast majority, if not all, of law school graduates have exposure to issues of international, transnational, and comparative law.'"); Mathias Reimann, 
gation,
9 the future promises greater clashes between judicial systems as litigants are tempted to forum shop, vying to find courts and law more favorably inclined to them than their opponents.
10
Despite its salience, few commentators have addressed the issue of reactive, 11 duplicative foreign proceedings. The treatment of these kinds of parallel proceedings "remains one of the most unsettled areas of the law," 12 and a dearth of scholarship explores how a court should proceed if the same case is already pending in a foreign forum. Lower court decisions are muddled, as judges apply at least three distinct approaches that are undertheorized. 13 The U.S. Supreme Court, for its part, has never spoken directly to the issue and has not rescued the lower courts from their confusion. 14 The United States is not alone in its uncertainty. Other 9 Some have described the U.S.'s three largest exports as "'rock music, blue jeans, and United States law.'" United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 281 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 257, 257 (1980) 'L L. 314, 314 (1997) (arguing that "[f] orum shopping, which used to be a favorite indoor sport of international lawyers, has developed into a fine art."). For an empirical assessment of whether forum shopping leads to a change in the law, see Christopher Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV (2009) (forthcoming) . 11 Reactive litigation refers to a countersuit that the first action's defendant files against the first action's plaintiff. In contrast, repetitive litigation is when a plaintiff files two or more parallel suits against the same defendant. This article focuses on reactive litigation only. Compare Allan D. Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IOWA L. REV. 11 (1961) with Allan D. Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IOWA L. REV. 525 (1960) .
12 N. Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of International Parallel Proceedings, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 602, 603 (2006) . 13 As described in section I.B, the three approaches are often referred to as the Colorado River, Landis, and international abstention approaches. See infra notes x-y; see Goldhammer v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252 (D. Mass. 1999 ) (noting disagreement among federal courts as how to approach requests to dismiss or stay a proceeding pending the outcome of a parallel proceeding in a foreign court).
14 Calamita, supra note 12, at 603; Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 99, 103-04 (1986) (arguing that "[r] ather than providing the lower courts with meaningful criteria for principled restraint, the Supreme Court has supplied an empty conglomeration of talismanic phrases and incantations"); Martine Stückelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens at the Hague Conference, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 949, 960-61 (2001) (arguing that the lack of a Supreme Court decision has led to different approaches in different circuits).
[Vol.
countries struggle with these difficult issues too.
15 A potentially seminal case on duplicative foreign litigation was recently before the Supreme Court of Canada, 16 and the decision reveals the same doctrinal confusion found in U.S. decisions.
17
In the United States, ingrained assumptions contribute to the difficulty in responding to duplicative litigation. For one, much of the existing analysis of foreign parallel proceedings is drawn from domestic theory, without any serious consideration as to whether the domestic can be so easily grafted onto the international, or whether the two situations are comparable at all. 18 A form of American exceptionalism is also often at play.
19 Some issues are too important, or so it is believed, to be left to foreign 15 Feb. 20, 2009 ). The Supreme Court of Canada's decision summarily concluded that the issue of parallel proceedings can be addressed through the use of the forum non conveniens doctrine, without explaining the reasons for its application. The approach ultimately assumed that the waste of duplicative actions is inevitable. 18 Teitz, supra note 8, at 71 (arguing that "in the United States there is a continuing attempt to squeeze the parallel proceedings problem into the shoes of domestic doctrines, shoes that are both too small and too old to fit the larger needs of transnational dispute resolution"); Stephen B. Burbank, The United States' Approach to International Civil Litigation: Recent Developments, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 14-17 (1998) (describing how through "cross-fertilization" domestic doctrines drive analysis of foreign parallel proceedings); see also Dubinsky, supra note x, at 341 (describing how courts are prone to use domestic doctrine when addressing transnational issues). For a general discussion of the incorrect reliance on domestic precedent in the transnational context, see Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209 , 1222 -24 (11 Cir. 1999 ; see also Louise Ellen Teitz, International Litigation: Parallel Proceedings and the Guiding Hand of Comity, 34 INT'L LAW. 545, 546-47 (2000) . 19 For a description of different kinds of American exceptionalism, see Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479 REV. . 1480 REV. -87 (2003 ; see also James C. Hathaway, America, Defender of Democratic Legitimacy, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 121 (2000) .
courts. Lastly, the question of what to do with parallel proceedings conventionally has had an awkward relationship with jurisdictional doctrines. The existence of jurisdiction -and the federal courts' "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise it 20 -is touted as the primary reason why even duplicative actions must proceed unhindered.
21
This Article takes a different tack. After critiquing and describing the limitations of current doctrine, it argues that when courts address foreign duplicative litigation they must account for the breadth of their extraterritorial jurisdictional assertions. In recent decades, jurisdictional doctrines have expanded dramatically not through legislative enactment, but by virtue of judgemade rules that have untethered jurisdiction, choice of law, and related doctrines from their original territorial moorings.
22 Since a dramatic re-envisioning of these doctrines seems unlikely, staying duplicative litigation becomes a key means for courts to accommodate and cabin the excesses of modern jurisdictional law and to avoid overburdening the judiciary. In short, to the extent that U.S. courts continue to exercise jurisdiction broadly (perhaps, in some contexts, exorbitantly) a greater willingness to stay reactive domestic litigation in the face of first-filed foreign proceedings is prudent.
Viewing abstention as a way to temper extraterritorial jurisdiction, this article concludes by offering a new approach to dupli-20 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805 (1976) ; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404 (1821) ("We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution); Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (18 How.) 170, 175 (1857) (explaining that when a court has jurisdiction "[t]he courts cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another forum"). This concept of the mandatory exercise of jurisdiction likely evolved from the common law rule judex tenetur impertiri judicium suum (a court with jurisdiction over a case is bound to decide it). Sim v. Robinow, Fourth Ser., Vol. IXI, S.C. 665, 68 (1892) . 21 For perhaps the most well known article arguing that federal courts violate separation of powers when they decline to exercise jurisdiction in the face of parallel state proceedings, see Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and Rev. 1035 Rev. (1990 . For a recent detailed description of how even textualists have erratically interpreted jurisdictional statutes, see Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883 (2008) .
cative foreign proceedings. Courts should embrace a modified lis alibi pendens principle 23 and reverse the prevailing presumption, which is heavily weighted in favor of allowing cases to continue even when duplicative foreign litigation is ongoing. Departing from current practice, courts should usually stay domestic proceedings when a first-filed foreign action exists, so long as the foreign court would have jurisdiction over the action under U.S. jurisdictional principles.
24 Creating a rough symmetry between stay decisions and when a foreign court is considered a reasonable and appropriate forum under U.S. jurisdictional rules would create a fairer system for litigants, reduce the waste of unnecessary duplication, and, on balance, better serve long-term U.S. interests.
I. THE PROBLEM
Any proposal for addressing duplicative foreign litigation must account for the costs that parallel proceedings impose. In the literature, these costs are often downplayed, while the three primary doctrinal approaches to parallel proceedings that courts currently employ only partly capture what is at stake.
A. Waste, Inefficiencies, and Gamesmanship
Parallel proceedings raise a host of problems. As one commentator explains: "there is almost nothing in principle to support the maintenance of concurrent, parallel proceedings in the courts of different countries." 25 Duplicative litigation is patently wasteful. 26 It imposes a heavy financial burden on the parties by 23 Lis alibi pendens, or simply lis pendens, is defined as a "suit pending elsewhere." Black's Law Dictionary 931 (6 th ed. 1990). 24 The approach would be similar to what some have referred to as the "recognition prognosis" that has been adopted in many Western European countries. See J.J. FAWCETT, supra note 15, at 36-37. 25 Calamita, supra note 12, at 609; see also Janet Walker, Parallel Proceedings -Converging Views: The Westec Appeal, 38 CAN. Y.B. INT 'L L. 155, 155 (2000) ("In the jungles of transnational litigation, there is probably nothing quite as savage as parallel litigation. It is savage because the commencement of a second proceeding on the same matters in a different forum almost inevitably represents some form of abuse."); Vestal, supra note x, at 15 ("The policy of law generally seems to be that all facets of a controversy should be tried in a single action."
26 James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049 , 1064 (1994 ("Many of the costs of du-forcing them to litigate the same case simultaneously in two places, and sometimes in piecemeal fashion. 27 It also needlessly consumes scarce court resources, as two judges work on the same legal problem. 28 The waste is magnified if the ultimate judgment in one action renders the other action meaningless. 29 The concern for conserving scarce judicial resources should not be downplayed: the back-log of cases in U.S. courts 30 [Vol.
Issues of cost and efficiency are not the only concern. Parallel proceedings are also problematic because they "smack of indefensible gamesmanship, jeopardizing public faith in the judicial system." 32 A litigant may file parallel proceedings solely as a means to vex or harass the opposing party. 33 At the very least, the ability to file a concurrent, parallel action invites tactics designed to delay the suit from proceeding in the forum not of the plaintiff's choice. 34 This is the race to judgment problem. 35 Concurrent proceedings can also lead to inconsistent judgments and subject the parties to incompatible obligations. 36 In some cases, a settlement 185, 196-98 (1989) strategy motivates the filing of a reactive suit, as the costs of litigating on two fronts are prohibitive for many plaintiffs. 37 Further considerations exist beyond cost, efficiency, and gamesmanship. Continuing a case, when the same case between the same parties was already filed in a foreign forum, can implicate foreign relations and breed resentment. Not only are "foreign relations apt to be more fragile" than state-to-state and federal-tostate relations, "but they are also more apt to be disturbed -specifically by the apparent interference of one state's courts in the judicial business of another's." 38 In high-profile suits, duplicative litigation can potentially interfere with the executive's management of foreign affairs. 39 And when duplicative litigation proceeds simultaneously in two countries, courts are aware of the key role they play. "One court may be asked to accelerate (or delay) its adjudication to thwart (or enhance) the potentially preclusive effect of a result in the other court, a strategy that squarely pits docket against docket, if not court against court." 40 For these reasons, near universal agreement exists that duplicative litigation, in theory, should be avoided.
B. Three Doctrinal Approaches
Presently, U.S. courts apply variations on three different approaches when concurrent, duplicative proceedings are pending in a foreign country.
41 In all three approaches, courts mostly con-37 Furutu, supra note x, at 5 (describing how the defendant may "intend[] to place the burden on the plaintiff in anticipation of a favorable settlement of the dispute"). For a classic example, see Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971 tinue to address parallel proceedings in the international context using the tools of domestic doctrine. And generally courts are reluctant to stay an action pending resolution of a first-filed foreign action -concerned that "deferring" to a foreign court constitutes an abdication of its responsibility to hear a case once jurisdiction vests.
42 As detailed below, the overriding presumption is against declining jurisdiction.
The first approach developed from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1976 landmark Colorado River decision.
43 The Colorado River case involved the exercise of federal jurisdiction when the parties were simultaneously litigating the same issues in state court.
44 In now oft-cited language, the Court cautioned that abstention in the federal-state context should occur only in "exceptional" circumstances because a "virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them" exists. 45 The Court explained, however, that in rare cases "principles unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state relations" control.
46 Abstention might be appropriate, the Court found, when necessary for " [w] ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation." 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2006) ; cf. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 454 (2d Cir.2000 ) (as amended) ("When a court dismisses a complaint in favor of a foreign forum pursuant to the doctrine of international comity, it declines to exercise jurisdiction it admittedly has."). A second, related approach recognizes the general "unflagging obligation" of federal courts to exercise jurisdiction conferred upon them, but then focuses on the unique considerations that private international disputes raise. 53 Characterized as international abstention, this second approach infuses comity and broader fairness considerations into the analysis, as well as conshould be considered and balanced to determine whether to abstain under Colorado River: (1) whether either court has assumed jurisdiction over a res; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; (4) consideration of where the case was filed first; (5) whether state or federal law controls; and (6) 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2006 ) (noting that "while the relevant factors to be considered differ depending on the posture of the case, the starting point for the inquiry remains unchanged: a district court's 'virtually unflagging obligation' to exercise its jurisdiction"). 53 For a recent example, see Belize Telecom, Ltd. v. Government of Belize, 528 F.3d 1298 (11 th Cir. 2008) (noting the general obligation to exercise jurisdiction, but noting a narrow exception for some private international law cases); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (discussing international abstention but explaining how abstention must be rare as courts have an unflagging obligation to except jurisdiction).
cern over the efficient use of judicial resources.
54 Under the international abstention approach, courts tend to more readily stay an action pending resolution of an identical, first-filed, foreign proceeding. Several courts, however, have limited the application of international abstention -and, in turn, the use of comity -to when a foreign decision has been reached (finding it inapplicable to pending foreign actions).
55 Notably, unlike stays entered under the Colorado River doctrine, stays granted employing the international abstention doctrine are generally not considered "final rulings" and therefore are not immediately appealable.
56
The third approach -and the least followed for transnational litigation 57 -is drawn from cases dealing with parallel litigation pending in more than one federal court.
58 In that context, some-54 Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH,. Under the international abstention doctrine, courts promote three "readily identifiable goals": (1) international comity; (2) fairness to litigants; and (3) Cir. Oct. 20, 2008) (finding stay order did not constitute a final order and appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear appeal); Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406, 408 (8th Cir.1993 ) (finding stay order is not immediately appealable).
57 James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 769 (1999) (noting that "Landis is not often cited by courts addressing intrafederal parallels, apparently because its formulation of a first-impression test has been superseded by later, more definitive cases."). Compare BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 41, at 523 ("Although it has been occasionally suggested that the lis pendens doctrine is not available in international cases, the doctrine has frequently been invoked to stay domestic actions in favor of parallel proceedings in non-U.S. courts.") with George A. Bermann, 59 This approach can be traced to the case Landis v. North American Co., where Justice Cardozo, writing for the court, rested the decision to stay on the inherent equitable powers of the court: "The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants."
60 Under Landis, courts employ a balancing test 61 that requires the movant to "make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward [in the other forum] . . . ." The burden is on the party seeking the stay to establish grounds for it; while the court's decision to grant the stay is discretionary.
62
Another wrinkle adds to the confusion. Although these three approaches to reactive, duplicative litigation are different, with distinct emphases and historical roots, courts have blurred the REV. 1023 REV. , 1038 REV. -43 (1985 . 60 Landis, 299 U.S. at x. For a recent discussion of the court's inherent authority to control procedure, see Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008) . 61 In determining whether to grant a motion to stay, courts consider such factors as: (1) the length of the requested stay; (2) the "hardship or inequity" that the movant would face in going forward with the litigation; (3) the injury that a stay would inflict upon the non-movant; and (4) whether a stay will simplify issues and promote judicial economy. St. Clair Intell. Prop. Consultants v. Fujifilm Holding Corp., Slip Copy, 2009 WL 192457 (D. Del. 2009 ) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55). Other courts have said the Landis test balances seven factors: (1) comity; (2) the adequacy of relief available in the other forum; (3) judicial efficiency; (4) the degree of identity of the parties and issues in the two cases; (5) the likelihood of prompt disposition in the other forum; (6) convenience to the parties, counsel, and witnesses; and (7) the possibility of prejudice if the stay or dismissal is granted. Nigro v. Blumberg, 373 F. Supp. 1206 , 1213 (C.D. Pa. 1974 ; see also Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 397 (10th Cir.1977 Cir.1977 ) (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-255) (explaining that whether to enter a stay is within the sound discretion of the district court and that the party seeking the stay bears the burden of showing "that there is pressing need for delay, and that neither the other party nor the public will suffer harm from entry of the order."); see also Dellinger v. Mitchell, 442 F.2d 782 (C.A.D.C.1971) ; Castanho v. Jackson Marine, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 201, 209 (E.D. Tex.1980) ; Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 285 F. Supp. 61 (D. Del. 1968 ).
lines between them.
63 Judges commonly now cite all three approaches -relying on Colorado River, Landis or international abstention cases simultaneously -neglecting to acknowledge the tension (or, perhaps, even inconsistency) in doing so.
64
II. THE CRITIQUE All three analytical approaches that U.S. courts use fail to adequately address, in differing degrees, the problems of firstfiled, duplicative foreign proceedings. Courts would be better off decoupling the issue of foreign duplicative proceedings from the domestic abstention doctrines and expressly recognizing that international abstention acts as a counter to balance the increasingly broad jurisdictional reach of American courts.
A. The Limits of Current Doctrine
The present approaches to first-filed, foreign, duplicative litigation can be critiqued on a number of fronts. As an initial matter, Landis abstention -used to address duplicative federal court proceedings -conceptually is ill-suited for the international context.
65 Landis is concerned with intra-jurisdictional stays, when the reactive litigation is filed in the same court system. Distinguishing between intra-and inter-jurisdictional stay requests is sound: although the differences are sometimes overplayed, 66 foreign courts can have starkly different judicial systems and con-63 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 41, at 526, n.31 (noting that "several recent courts are beginning to blur the traditional fine distinctions between the 'Colorado River' approach and the 'Landis' approach. Instead, they cite principles from both decisions and announce a set of factors drawing on both lines of authority"). 64 Id. (citing National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Kozeny, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1243 , 1246 -47 (D. Colo. 2000 and Goldhammer v. Dunkin Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251-53 (D. Mass. 1990) ); see also George, supra note x, at 907 (Baylor) (explaining how courts have integrated both the Landis and Colorado River approaches, and how the tests are similar in application). 65 See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 887 n.10 (3d. Cir. 1981 Cir. ), aff'd, 456 U.S. 694 (1982 (asserting that the firstto-file rule was never meant to apply in cases where two courts were not of the same sovereign). 66 An example exists in the debate over the use of foreign law in U.S. decision. ceptions of justice.
67 Bright-line, automatic, first-to-file rules (without other adjustments) work best when similar jurisdictional and judgment enforcement rules are used and the existence of concurrent jurisdiction is rare.
68 Moreover, in practice, courts that utilize Landis as the starting point for the analysis, commonly end up considering factors similar to those considered under the Colorado River or international abstention approaches.
69
On the other hand, the other two approaches -Colorado River and international abstention -have their own limitations. Both approaches have led to paradoxical result. Under current law, U.S. courts are more respectful of comity when no foreign action exists and the offense to foreign sovereigns is at best speculative, than when a foreign court has already asserted jurisdiction and the likelihood of offense is real. This is because courts may dismiss a case by virtue of forum non conveniens without considering its "unflagging" obligation to exercise jurisdiction.
70 Under forum non conveniens, a U.S. court will dismiss if it finds itself to be a significantly inconvenient forum and that the interests of the public and the parties would be better served by requiring that the action be litigated elsewhere.
71 The paradox is therefore twofold. First, courts are more willing to dismiss than stay an action 67 The approaches to forum non conveniens itself varies dramatically. J.J. FAWCETT, supra note 15 (describing the different approaches throughout the world); KARAYANNI, supra note x (describing approaches to forum non conveniens).
68 Blom, supra note x, at 2 (While "priority in time is normally decisive in [intra-jurisdictional] [Vol.
(i.e., are more willing to impose a harsher result).
72 Second, courts find comity to be a more potent concept when the possibility of offending a foreign sovereign and the threat of duplicative costs is at most speculative.
This inconsistent treatment -difficult to justify in any principled way -is likely one of historical oddity. Courts developed one line of cases under forum non conveniens, while simultaneously crafting international abstention in an entirely separate line of cases, without recognizing the substantial overlap. In the forum non conveniens context, 73 unlike with abstention, the notion of an unflagging obligation to exercise jurisdiction long ago gave way to the concept of international comity.
74
Another problem exists in relying on Colorado River in international cases. The unflagging obligation of federal courts to exercise jurisdiction is a principle peculiar to the domestic context. The "unflagging" obligation language developed in the context of the civil rights movement 75 and despite some protests in 'Y 127, 130 (1989) ; see also Friedman, supra note x, at 537-38 ("Implicit in every criticism of abstention is the assumption that, absent federal forum, federal a rights will not be vindi-
courts must exercise the jurisdiction Congress has granted them is the acknowledgement that the Constitution grants Congress the primary authority for defining the federal court's jurisdiction.
80
Regardless of the merits of the parity debate, the considerations animating it are not present in the international context.
81
The nation's system of federalism specifically embraces and encourages concurrent federal and state court jurisdiction, 82 and achieving the correct balance between federal and state court authority is a key component of federalism.
83 In contrast, no higher civil court exists on the international plane, 84 nor does any world constitution purport to distribute authority between different nacated. Abstention's critics are of the view that state courts are not as sensitive to claims of federal rights as are federal courts. Thus, denial of a federal forum runs the risk of effectively denying the plaintiff a federal right."). (1) a national of an accepting nonstate party commits a crime within the territory of a state party, or (2) a national of a nonparty commits a crime referred to the ICC by the Security Council).
tions' courts.
85 Internationally, concurrent exercise of authority is often discouraged to avoid conflict, and each nation-state is under an obligation to exercise its sovereignty in a way that reduces interference with the sovereignty of others.
86
Nor do the separation of powers concerns, which have been thought to require courts to exercise jurisdiction once vested, 87 exist in the international context. In domestic cases, declining jurisdiction in the absence of clear statutory authority may or may not be "a power grab -a usurpation of congressional power to define the jurisdiction of the federal courts -that is incompati- 85 See U.N. Charter, Art. 2(7) ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."). There are some who notably argue for the "constitutionalization" of international law. For a recent discussion of some of the literature, see Thomas Giegerich, The Is and [Vol.
ble with basic premises of constitutional democracy."
88 But in the international context, the existence of parallel proceedings is largely not one of Congressional choice, but a result of judge-made jurisdictional rules. 89 Presumably what the courts give, they can take away.
90
Another point is worth making, although not peculiar to foreign parallel proceedings. The universally quoted language that courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation" to hear cases is, as a descriptive matter, simply wrong. Courts flag in their obligation to hear cases all the time. From the justiciability doctrines, 91 to forum non conveniens, 92 to abstention, 93 to exhaustion of state remedies, 94 to supplemental jurisdiction, 95 courts now commonly decline to hear cases even though jurisdiction has attached.
96 The appropriate question to ask then is not whether courts may decline jurisdiction -that happens routinely as the so-called "absolute right" doctrine has come into disfavor.
97 The question is whether declining jurisdiction in a particular context is wise. At the very least, staying a case in the face of parallel litigation is substantially more similar to forum non conveniens than domestic abstention doctrines -in fact, several countries address parallel litigation through their forum non conveniens doctrines.
98 And in any case, when a court stays a case, rather than dismissing it, a court technically has not abdicated its duty or refused to exercise the jurisdiction granted it.
99
So reliance on the "unflagging obligation" is particularly misplaced.
100
The three approaches contain other oddities that make them poorly suited for handling duplicative foreign litigation. One puzzling one is the continued distinction between in rem, quasi-in- 94 David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 558-59 (1985) . 95 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (providing courts discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction).
96 David Shapiro wrote the pathbreaking article arguing that courts have discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction, see Shapiro, supra note x, at 547 (explaining how courts have significant discretion to decline jurisdiction in a range of contexts); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891 REV. (2004 Ct. 1712 Ct. , 1723 Ct. (1996 ("Unlike the outright dismissal or remand of a federal suit, we held, an order merely staying the action 'does not constitute abnegation of judicial duty. On the contrary, it is a wise and productive discharge of it. There is only postponement of decision for its best fruition.'") (quoting Thibodaux, 360 U.S., at 29). 100 For early cases where the Court rejected the Cohens v. Virginia formulation and declined to exercise jurisdiction over foreign matters, see Canada Malting Co. v. Patterson S.S. Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 422-23 (1932) (jurisdiction properly declined where all parties were Canadian citizens and litigation would be more appropriately conducted in foreign court); The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 364-65 (1885) (courts to use discretion in accepting jurisdiction over controversies when all parties are foreigners).
rem, and in personam actions.
101 If the first-filed case is an in rem action then courts will routinely stay litigation 102 on the fiction that only one sovereign may effectively exercise jurisdiction over a res.
103 The focus though on whether a court has assumed jurisdiction over a res is strange. Shaffer v. Heitner 104 purportedly precluded such a basis for differentiating between cases; the Supreme Court having long interred the hoary distinction between in rem and in personam labels, at least for jurisdictional purposes.
105 Although in rem cases may well provide a stronger case (1884)) ("[W]hen one takes into its jurisdiction a specific thing, that res is as much withdrawn from the judicial power of the other, as if it had been carried physically into a different territorial sovereignty. To attempt to seize it by a foreign process is futile and void."); see also Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently Pending State Court Suits, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 684, 684 (1960); Note, Power To Stay Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 Yale L.J. 978 (1950) 104 433 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1977) (characterizing any distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction as a "fiction" and stating that all exercises of personal jurisdiction, whether in rem, quasi in rem or in personam, must satisfy the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe and its progeny); see also Lastly, a more fundamental weakness can be levied against all three approaches. The approaches are easily manipulatedriddled with a long litany of ill-defined policy and other vague considerations.
106 Some courts balance as many as three factors, and ten sub-factors.
107 But no guidance is given to how much relevance or weight a court should afford each factor. And often the factors are apples and oranges to one another. For example, although courts routinely pay lip-service to adjudicatory comity, courts appear to have little understanding of what exactly "comity" consists of, or what weight to afford it in the final analysis.
108
When should reciprocity considerations trump efficiency and access-to-justice concerns? Courts are at a loss. And how the factors indicate an outcome in a given case is almost anyone's guess. The different epistemological age"); Rehnquist, supra note 26, at 1106 ("[A]fter the fiction of in rem jurisdiction has been drained of any force in the personal jurisdiction context, one can hardly take seriously a rule that can be explained only by recourse to the in rem-in personam distinction."); Mullenix, supra note 14, at 120 (arguing that the jurisdiction over the res principle contained in Colorado River "consists of an anachronistic jurisdictional principle" that "is something of an anomaly").
result of such a vague and open-ended balancing is a hodge-podge of ad hoc, results-oriented decisions, and the absence of any sort of predictability.
109 One respected commentator has harshly observed that decisions relying on Colorado River are inevitably conclusory and filled with "legal gibberish."
110

B. Jurisdictional Expansion
Another way of looking at foreign parallel proceedings exists; one that appreciates the interconnectedness between the growth of concurrent actions and the expanding reach of a court's jurisdiction. As a general matter, U.S. Courts have systematically broadened their jurisdictional reaches as territorial theories of jurisdiction have been discarded.
111 More recently, pressure to use domestic laws (rather than international law) to solve global problems and extend American power abroad has contributed to these jurisdictional expansions. As these expansions have occurred, the number of concurrent and overlapping actions have in turn exploded.
Legal Realism and the End of Territoriality
Before the Second World War, territoriality was a defining feature of American law.
112 Conflicts-of-law doctrine, 113 as well as prescriptive 114 and adjudicatory jurisdiction 115 were founded on 109 Cf. Stein, supra note x, at 785 (explaining how forum nonconveniens decisions, with similar balancing tests, "tend to be a mechanical litany of the seminal Supreme Court language followed by a summary conclusion.").
110 Mullenix, supra note 14, at 104. 111 Stephens, supra note x, at 634 ("Since World War II, U.S. courts have generally broadened their subject matter and personal jurisdiction); see also 113 See 1 JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 311-12 (1935) ("Since the power of a state is supreme within its own territory, no other state can exercise power there . . . It follows generally that no statute has force to affect any person, thing, or act outside the territory of the state that passed it."); see also LEAH BRILMAYER, CONFLICTS OF LAWS (2d ed. 1995) (describing territorial theories of conflict of laws). 114 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) ("The general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done."); territorial theories that geographically constrained judicial power.
116 Jurisdiction was explicitly based on territoriality: a theory derived from Dutch scholars 117 which found "each sovereign had jurisdiction, exclusive of all other sovereigns, to bind persons and things within its territorial boundaries."
118
Or, in Justice Story's words, "every nation possesse[d] exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory," and "it would be wholly incompatible with equality and exclusiveness of the sovereignty of all nations, that any one nation should be at liberty to regulate either persons or things not within its territory."
119 With the world carved up into separate, territorial regions and court power based on territorial principles, jurisdictional overlap and the problem of parallel proceedings were rare.
120
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (explaining that the jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory is "necessarily exclusive and absolute" and, accordingly, that territory demarcated the limits of nation's law); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66, 122 (1825) (explaining that "no nation can prescribe a rule for others"); The Appollon, 22 U.S. 363, 370 (1824) ("The laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territory, except so far as regards its own citizens."). 
At the end of the Second World War, however, pragmatism, legal realism, and other related theories began to discredit territorial theories of jurisdiction and the problem of concurrent jurisdictional assertions became more prevalent.
121 Legal realists attacked the formalist assumptions that underpinned territorial approaches to law.
122
The power to regulate did not flow "naturally and inevitably from some self-evident theory" as territoriality, realists argued.
123
Instead, realists pushed for "reasonableness" to be the touchstone of any jurisdictional analysis.
124
The result -through a series of decisions in the mid-centurywas that the law of personal jurisdiction, legislative jurisdiction, 185, 193-202 (1984) (explaining how territorial theories of jurisdiction avoided jurisdictional conflicts and overlap). REV. 257, 316 (1990) (noting that legal rules in the nineteenth century were "fixed, inexorable, and logically deductible"); see also MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780 -1860 259 (1977 . 123 Kramer, supra note x, at 209; Karayanni, supra note x, at 120-21, n.62 (arguing that legal realism was "a legal movement that sought to substitute notions of territoriality with functional standards to guarantee fairness of outcomes"); see, e.g., ERNEST LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 11 (1947) ("The common law has not hidden in its bosom a logical set of rules which can be derived from its notion of territoriality . . . . [T] he adoption of the one rule or the other depends entirely upon considerations of policy which each sovereign state must determine for itself."). 124 130 -the Court discarded a core premise of early jurisdictional doctrines that states could not assert jurisdiction over people outside their borders. Together the decisions interred the premise that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory" and that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory."
International Law Restraints on the Reach of National Laws
131 Judicial inquiry "shifted from territorial
considerations to a qualitative evaluation of the relationships among the plaintiff, the defendant, the forum state, and the events occasioning the litigation." 132 The idea that fairness and not territorial borders provided the only limitation on jurisdictional power was then carried to the international context. 133 Courts finally expanded personal jurisdiction by re-embracing a form of territoriality through transient jurisdiction.
134 U.S. courts now exercise "general jurisdiction based solely on transient physical presence, attachment of property, or extensive business activities unrelated to the cause of action."
135
The same drift occurred in the context of legislative jurisdiction: courts moved from a doctrine based on territorial limits to one founded on concepts of fairness. Initially, legislatures were barred from creating laws that regulated foreigners abroad.
136
Over time that prohibition changed to a presumption, where Con-gress was permitted to regulate abroad, but was presumed not to.
137 More recently, the presumption was turned upside-down, and with the development of the so-called "effects test,"
138 which has given courts near universal jurisdiction.
139
As legal rules of jurisdiction became more indeterminate, the jurisdictional reach of American courts grew exponentially.
140 In fact, the growth was so dramatic the development of the forum non conveniens doctrine was arguably the result of the expanding jurisdictional reaches of courts and the need, for the first time, "to decline jurisdictional power, notwithstanding its existence." Cir. 1998); Envtl Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968 
Globalization and the World in U.S Courts
Legal realism and the demise of territorial rules, however, was just a harbinger of things to come. Although jurisdiction expanded mid-century with the decline of territorial theories, it continued to expand at the turn of the century for at least two additional reasons. The first was globalization and technological advances. The second, and arguably more important although often downplayed, was the reluctance in the U.S. to embrace international law and the systematic turn to national courts and domestic law to solve international challenges.
Early in the century, the international cartel movement created complex business relationships that crossed national borders.
142
In the later part of the century, globalization -and a number of great technological advances in communication and transportation 143 -led to tremendous interdependence between countries, as trade and labor mobility increased.
144 As economies became more interdependent, the pressure to regulate crossborder activities increased. GLOBALIZATION 219, 220, 234-48 (Miles Kahler & Barbara F. Walter eds., 2006) (arguing territoriality is "decreasingly important as a jurisdictional principle" in a globalizing world); John Gerrard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139, 148-63 (1993) (discussing the evolution of modern territoriality); Saskia Sassen, Territory and Territoriality in portation became easier, jurisdiction doctrines based on reasonableness meant broader jurisdictional assertions were permissible.
146 The advent of the internet led to further pressure to ignore any remaining territorial limits to the exercise of judicial power, and increased the number of overlapping laws.
The second driving force was both the move away from international law as a palatable way to address global challenges. During the late 1990s, conservative, neo-realist scholars 148 attacked international law believing it to threaten American independence. 149 Modern internationalist scholars also turned away from international law, promoting non-state and sub-state actors, who sought to have a greater voice and role in international law and relations.
150 Both positions were ideologically driven, and intimately tied to the domestic culture wars. 151 The neo-realists were largely allied with conservative domestic movements, who for decades had sought to roll back a progressive civil rights agenda. 152 The modern internationalists in turn sought to give greater power to environmental, human rights, and indigenous rights group as a way of advancing a progressive values.
153
Both groups were successful in their own way. The United States has increasingly withdrawn from international law and its institutions, preferring to use domestic law (applied extraterritoriality) to solve global challenges.
154 Many see U.S. courts as "both a means for addressing many of the world's evils and a model for others to emulate."
155 Currently, few disputes escape the long jurisdictional arms of U.S. courts.
III. THE PROPOSAL
What is needed is an integrated approach to parallel litigation that recognizes how parallel litigation is connected to jurisdiction, avoids the costs of unnecessary duplication, and protects American interests from foreign overreaching. A two-step inquiry commends itself to achieving these goals.
156
A. Reversing the Presumption
As a starting point, courts should reverse the existing presumption and do away with references -in the international context -to a court's unflagging obligation to exercise jurisdiction. 'L L. 945, 945 (2008) ("New actors have been empowered in the international legal system (not only individuals but various kinds of non-state collectivities as well); conceptions of responsibility have been altered; classic notions, such as territorial sovereignty and recognition of statehood, have sometimes subtly and sometimes radically been reshaped or adapted."). 154 For an expanded discussion of this phenomenon, see Parrish, supra note x (Minn. LR). 155 Stephan, supra note x, at 627. 156 The proposal has similar elements to that recently suggested by N. Jansen Calamita. The proposals differ, however, in that this one does not promote adjudicatory comity as the basis for the proposal, but instead is more pragmatic in its approach as a way to promote U.S. interests while avoiding unnecessary waste. See Calamita, supra note 12. 157 The reversal of the presumption is not an academic change. Presumptions are significant. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
A court should presumptively find a stay warranted if the moving party can establish: (1) that parallel foreign action was filed first; and (2) that the foreign court would have jurisdiction over the action consistent with U.S. jurisdictional principles.
Tethering the initial presumption to U.S. jurisdictional standards has benefits. First, for the foreign court to have jurisdiction (under U.S. principles), by definition the foreign court would be considered an acceptable forum under U.S. Due Process standards.
158 The minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction ensures that the defendant have sufficient contacts with the foreign forum so that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.
159 The effects test for prescriptive (legislative) jurisdiction similarly ensures that the foreign forum has some connection to the underlying transaction upon which the lawsuit is based (i.e., a substantial effect is felt in the foreign forum).
160
Second, the presumption is easy to apply and would lead to greater predictability. The presumption does not require the court to balance multiple factors, assess the unquantifiable (and often unknowable) interests of a foreign forum, or otherwise evaluate foreign law.
161 Instead, the test would require merely that the court assess what it does routinely (i.e., whether it has jurisdiction to proceed). Lastly, creating symmetry between jurisdiction and international abstention ensures that U.S. interests are accounted for. If Congress believes that too many parallel actions are being decided abroad, it need only curtail the breadth of the court's jurisdictional assertions. On the other hand, the U.S. interest in having a case heard locally is at its lowest, if the foreign court is a reasonable and appropriate forum (under U.S. standards). If, in contrast, the foreign court has asserted jurisdiction on an exorbitant basis 162 then the U.S. court should not defer (indeed, the foreign court's judgment will not be recognized or enforced) and the stay should be denied.
The benefits to staying an action, when the first-filed case is before a court of appropriate jurisdiction are manifest. First, the U.S. will avoid the costs that unnecessarily duplicative actions engender. Following the first-to-file rule reduces the number of transnational lawsuits proceeding concurrently, thereby eliminating the potential for conflicting decisions and discouraging an invidious race to judgment. Second, respecting a presumptive lis pendens rule would provide greater structure and guidance to the lower courts on what comity entails, while curbing the potential for unprincipled, ad hoc decisions and the attendant costs created by uncertainty. Instead of the current "hydra-headed" approach,
163
where courts have to balance multiple factors, the court would engage in one inquiry: can the plaintiff's claims be litigated in an already pending foreign forum with jurisdiction. Finally, it would discourage the filing of unnecessary reactive litigation in the future, and the corresponding increase in expense and inconvenience to the parties and courts. 161 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 787 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) ("The principle enquiry at the moment is into the Dutch experience, and I question whether an independent front-line investigation into the facts of a foreign country's legal administration can be soundly undertaken through American courtroom litigation."). In a different context, see Ernesto J. Sanchez, A Case Against Judicial Internationalism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 185 (2005) (arguing that judges with expertise in U.S. lack access to adequate resources to research foreign law).
162 A classic example is the French courts assertion of jurisdiction based on nationality alone. Civil Code Art. 14. 163 Rehnquist, supra note 26, at 1111.
B. Shifting Burdens
If the moving party makes the preliminary showing to establish a presumptive stay, the burden should then shift to the party opposing the stay. The initial presumption could be overcome through demonstrating that a manifest injustice would occur if the U.S. litigation does not proceed. A defendant meets this burden through establishing some fundamental unfairness in waiting until the foreign forum has concluded or by establishing that the foreign forum is a forum non conveniens. Courts should be particularly sensitive to whether the natural plaintiff filed the foreign action, and whether the U.S. case involves parties and activities occurring abroad (even if the U.S. forum itself is not forum non conveniens).
A hypothetical drives home the approach. Assume that a New York citizen is in a car accident in New York with a French citizen, and both suffer injuries. Also assume the French citizen brings an action in France, asserting jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's nationality, 164 and then the New York citizen brings an action in New York federal district court. The French citizen moves to stay the second-filed U.S. action. Under these circumstances, the U.S. federal court would deny any request to stay the second-file New York action. Jurisdiction based on a plaintiff's nationality is not a permissible based for jurisdiction under U.S. law 165 and therefore the French citizen could not meet its initial burden.
On the other hand, if the New York citizen had substantial contacts with France, sufficient to establish general jurisdiction under U.S. jurisdictional principles then potentially the French citizen could meet its initial burden. But the action would still be unlikely stayed. Under the forum non conveniens, a French court could well be viewed as an inappropriate forum given that the accident, witnesses, and events all occurred in New York. [Articles editor: please note that this section is being revised, but I felt it was far enough along for your review].
C. Responding to Critics
In essence, the proposed approach would create a presumption against duplicative litigation, so long as the foreign forum meets U.S. standards for fundamental fairness. The most common objection to this sort of approach is the perception that it would promote a race to the courthouse. But that concern seems misplaced. First, under any of the current approaches a race to the courthouse already exists. Current approaches consider who filed first as one of the many factors balanced in the analysis.
166
Similarly, we tolerate races already under Landis in federal-tofederal cases, as well as intrastate cases. 167 Second, the race to the courthouse seems less problematic than the alternative race to judgment. At least the race to the courthouse involves only the litigants, not the courts. 168 Another common objection suggests that staying a proceeding undermines a plaintiff's choice of forum. But this untrue. On the contrary, creating a presumption in favor of a stay better protects the plaintiff's choice of forum -a prerogative the U.S. system has long promoted. 169 Reactive litigation, by definition, attempts to displace the plaintiff's first-filed choice of forum, by permitting the defendant in the first action to second-guess the plaintiff's choice and litigate on two fronts.
170 By allowing actions first-filed in appropriate foreign courts to proceed, the plaintiff's choice is protected. Certainly this has to be better than the current state of affairs. The myriad of current approaches leave litigants with so little certainty about what the court will likely do, that it induces many litigants to strategically file a reactive suitknowing that doing so will significantly increase an opponent's costs, while creating more confusion at the judgment enforcement stage. 171 Nor does the approach elevate efficiency and administration considerations over issues of substance. As an initial matter, 166 167 See supra notes x-y, and accompanying text. 168 Rehnquist, supra note 26, at 1068, 1112 ("If there must be a race, let it exhaust only the litigants, not the courts as well."). [Vol.
much of modern U.S. federal civil procedure is animated by efficiency concerns and attempts to reduce the costs of litigation. From pleading requirements, 172 to rules of joinder, 173 to summary judgment, 174 to preclusion, 175 federal procedural rules seeks to avoid piece-meal litigation and promote efficiency. 176 It seems strange then that such efficiency concerns would be ignored in the parallel litigation context. But the approach is not simply driven by issues of cost: a more important interest is at stake. The United States has an interest in promoting an international system that reduces conflict and values democratic self-government. 177 Those ideals are undermined if our national courts (and others) exert their power extraterritorially. 178 As one circuit court explained the problems with such legal imperialism: 
CONCLUSION
Transnational litigation is here to stay. Cross-border and transboundary cases are simply a feature of a globalized, interconnected world. As a result, duplicative foreign proceedings will increase in frequency, becoming a more common phenomenon. In short, litigants increasingly have a choice of where to battle: here, abroad, or in both places. Despite this reality, U.S. federal courts have been slow to adjust to the realities of modern, transnational cases, preferring instead to apply domestic doctrine, despite the obvious inconsistencies in doing so.
This article advocates for an approach that seeks to avoid the needless costs of duplicative, reactive cases. Instead of the current approach, which is often animated by federalism concerns, the presumption should be in favor of staying a U.S. action in the face of a first-filed, duplicative, foreign proceeding, so long as the foreign forum has jurisdiction consistent with U.S. jurisdictional principles. That presumption should only be overcome if the party opposing the stay can demonstrate some fundamental unfairness in staying the U.S. action until the foreign proceeding is concluded. Adopting a modified lis pendens principle, and reversing the current presumption would help avoid the wastes inherent in duplicative litigation, and better serve long-term U.S. interests.
